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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On 1 March 2008 Danish Demining Group (DDG) entered into a two-year agreement with the
Swedish International Development Agency (Sida)1 to implement the project “Survey,
Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and Mine Risk Education in Southern Sudan”. The project
aims to support the repatriation process for refugees and IDPs in South Sudan by providing a
safe environment for the returnees and communities, and facilitating the work of
humanitarian organisations. As the project is scheduled to end in 2010, Sida and DDG decided
to commission an evaluation to inform the decision concerning a possible extension. The
evaluation was conducted by a team fielded by the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in the period February-March 2010.
DDG is one of a number of mine action operators working in South Sudan to address the
explosives contamination left from decades of civil war. The mine action programme has been
operating in parts of Sudan since 2002 and, since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
in early 2005, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) has had the responsibility of planning,
coordination and regulation. The Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of
South Sudan (GoSS) have also established national mine action authorities in Khartoum and
Juba respectively. The latter – the South Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) – is scheduled to
assume overall responsibility for mine action in the South when the UNMAO mandate ends in
July 2011.
South Sudan poses many challenges for mine action operators: vast distances, poor
infrastructure, and continued insecurity. In addition, there remains a great deal of uncertainty
whether the political milestones specified in the CPA (national elections in mid-April 2010 and
a referendum on independence for South Sudan in January 2011) will go forward as planned,
and whether they could spark renewed conflict.
Under the leadership of UNMAO, the mine action sector has formulated a Multi-Year Plan. This
provides a good outline of the plans until mid-2011, but little clarity on the GoSS vision for
mine action in South Sudan once it assumes responsibility for the sector after that date. These
many uncertainties greatly complicate the task of future planning for DDG.
DDG began operations in 2006 to facilitate the return of refugees, mainly in the returnee
corridors of Central and Eastern Equatoria. It has adopted a community-centred approach,
with priorities defined in a participatory manner; a contrast in South Sudan, where most mine
action activities are under UNMAO ‘command and control’. In 2008, DDG formulated a
Strategic Planning Document. In line with the objectives of the Sida-funded project, the vision
statement in the strategy highlighted the needs of returnees. The overall objective was
broader: “Creating an environment free of the threat of landmines and ERW, where people can
live safely and have access to land and natural resources.” The strategy also outlined six
specific objectives, which are summarised below.

1

In addition to Sida, DDG has received funding from UNHCR, the Netherlands, Canada, Austria and ECHO.
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1. An expansion of the operational area.
3. Improve HR management.
5. Strengthen ties to SSDC and potential
national NGO partners.

2. Investigate the feasibility of SALW activities.
4. Strengthen policy and programme
development
6. Cooperation with Danish Refugee Council
(DRC – DDG’s parent organisation) in Sudan

DDG provides a range of mine action services – survey and marking; explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD); Community Liaison; mine risk education (MRE) – and is in the process of
implementing an ‘impact monitoring’ system to document development outcomes. Its recent
operations have focused on Magwi county in Eastern Equatoria, where is has about 75 field
personnel working out of two camps. It has been giving increased attention to capacity
development, both for its own national staff and for personnel from SSDC and the Sudan
Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS – a local NGO). To date, capacity development efforts
have focused on technical and supervisory skills of individuals rather than the development of
broader organisational capabilities in national mine action organisations.
The evaluation team was asked to use the standard criteria2 used in development evaluation
to assess the plans, operations and achievements of DDG, and arrived at the following
principal conclusions:
Relevance – DDG’s choice of geographic areas, services to deliver and community-centred
delivery strategy are all relevant to the needs in South Sudan, and has been a useful
complement to the efforts of other mine action organisations. Its focus on returnees was
relevant in 2008, but is less so today as the flows of returnees has abated.
Efficiency – Overall, DDG has implemented the project well and has achieved, in whole of in
large part, its output targets. However, efficiency could be improved, particularly in the
delivery of MRE and via better training and support of its network of community volunteers.
Effectiveness – DDG has been effective in reducing risks to returnees, other community
members, and staff from humanitarian and development organisations working in those same
communities, although a more rigorous assessment of how significant the risk reduction has
been would need the type of data collected through the impact monitoring process, which is
not yet fully in place. DDG has also been effective in enhancing supervisory and technical skills
of South Sudanese working for it, SSDC, and SIMAS, but has not yet initiated more ambitious
organisational development efforts. It has made partial progress in promoting gender, but
little with respect to the second key cross-cutting issue – HIV/AIDS.
Sustainability – This was framed mainly in the context of exit and transition planning. DDG
does not have clear plans in place for the transition of activities to a national organisation and
its own eventual exit (at least from the direct delivery of its current set of mine action
activities). Admittedly, South Sudan at this juncture raises enormous challenges for mid- to
long-term planning, and UNMAO and SSDC have not yet formulated a clear vision for the mine
action sector after July-2011, which would provide DDG with at least a strategic framework to
build upon. The formulation of contingency plans probably represents the most viable way
forward.
2

The evaluation did not call for an assessment of impact, which would have been impossible given the absence of
baseline data, coupled with time and resource constraints.
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In addition, the evaluation team was asked to assess the DDG project using two additional
criteria: coverage and coordination.
Coverage – The team found no exclusion based on ethnicity and no serious exclusions based
on gender.3 However, MRE training does not reach the disabled.4
Coordination – DDG coordinates well with other mine action organisations in South Sudan, and
its relationships with donors, national authorities and UN agencies appear well established and
constructive. To date, it has not done enough to communicate and build links with civil society
organisations (CSO) and non-mine action NGOs.
Recommendations are as follows:
DDG should:
1. Revise its strategic plan to incorporate:
a focus on community security and development needs rather than the safe return of
refugees
contingency plans or strategic options regarding transition/exit, each based on a
potential scenario and depending on the outcomes of, at least:
o the national election
o the referendum on self-determination for South Sudan
o the ending or prolongation of the UNMAO mandate in the South
a more ambitious plan to support the development of national capacities, going
beyond individual capacities to include functional capabilities of partner organisations
(e.g. quality management; financial management) or the national programme (e.g.
national monitoring and evaluation systems)
options for enhancing its cost-effectiveness, which could entail
o reducing the number of expatriate staff, or
o achieving scale economies by broadening the geographic area of operations or
scope economies by adding new services, such as SALW management for
community security
2. Fully implement its plans for monitoring and reporting on the developmental outcomes
stemming, in whole or in part, from its services (i.e. baseline and post-completion
monitoring surveys).
3. Strengthen its coordination with development agencies working in the same geographic
areas.
4. Address cross-cutting issues more thoroughly; in particular, gender & diversity, plus
HIV/AIDS.
5. Strengthen its MRE services by:
3

The timing for MRE sessions may not be appropriate to women and should be assessed.
The evaluation team did not observe MRE sessions targeted for children during the mission, nor see training
materials appropriate for children. DDG has since confirmed that they do have MRE materials for children, and do
deliver sessions aimed at children.
4
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dividing participants into smaller groups based on age and gender, and building more
role play into the training, particularly for groups with lower literacy
developing the MRE volunteer resource more effectively by thorough vetting of
potential volunteers, a comprehensive training process, and regular monitoring and
evaluation of volunteer activities
expanding the number of MRE sessions held in a day and the number of communities
covered over a period of time
Sida should:
1. Maintain funding to DDG, assuming its project proposal adequately addresses the
recommendations listed above, including the incorporation of a transition and exit
strategy, at least with respect to the delivery of the existing range of MRE and EOD
services.
2. Work with other mine action donors to encourage UNMAO and SSDC to update the MultiYear Plan for the Mine Action Programme, which should incorporate clear statements on:
the projected extent and impact of the contamination that will remain as of mid-2011
(i.e. the needs assessment)
the capacities that will be required to address the threat remaining after mid-2011,
and
the GoSS vision and strategy for how those capacities will be financed and delivered,
including the capacities required for:
o making policy and strategy
o operational planning and coordination
o delivery of mine action services

v|Page
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1. INTRODUCTION
Rationale, Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation
On 1 March 2008 Danish Demining Group (DDG) entered into a two-year agreement with the
Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) to implement the project “Survey, Explosive
Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and Mine Risk Education in Southern Sudan”. The Sida financed
project period is ending in 2010 and Sida and DDG have discussed the possibility of a
continuation of the project. The two parties decided to commission an evaluation to inform
the extension decision. The purposes of the evaluation are to (i) inform decisions regarding the
possible continuation of the project and (ii) contribute to enhanced project performance. The
primary audiences are the Sida officials and DDG managers responsible for this project, plus
the Policy Unit within the Danish Refugee Council.
The principal objectives are to:
1. Ascertain results (outcomes and outputs) and
2. Assess the project in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and relevance.5
In addition, the evaluation report will feed-into a broader evaluation of Sida’s overall support
to mine action from 2001 to 2009.
Methodology
The evaluation featured (i) meetings with headquarters personnel in both Sida and DDG/DRC,
(ii) review of documents and data (e.g. LIS findings), and (iii) a field mission to South Sudan.
The following activities were undertaken during the field mission:
Meetings with the DDG project management team
Site visits to observe the EOD/BAC teams and to meet with team leaders
Community visits to observe the MRE and Community Liaison (CL) teams, meet team
leaders, and with community leaders and members to discuss their perceptions of the
impact of mines/ERW and the benefits stemming from DDG outputs (MRE sessions; CL
visits; EOD survey & clearance)
Review of operational planning and monitoring documents
Meetings with representatives from:
o Other mine action organisations (SSDC, UNMAO, NPA).
o Agencies involved with refugee/IDP returns, community development, community
security etc.
o UN agencies and international NGOs involved with refugee/IDP returns,
community development, community security etc.
o Members of the Joint Donor Team Office.
The strategy for the evaluation was to apply multiple methods in the form of semi-structured
interviews with project personnel, government officials, and experts from mine action and
other fields; observation; record review; review of secondary data; and participatory tools with
community members to obtain sufficient quantitative and qualitative data for triangulation
and for reliable conclusions to be drawn concerning the evaluation questions.

5

In addition, the evaluation will assess the project against the following criteria: institutional and financial
sustainability of the support provided to the project; coverage; and coordination.
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The evaluation was managed by Ted Paterson, Head of Evaluation and Policy Research at the
GICHD. The evaluation team consisted of Tim Lardner (mine action expert), Anna Woods
(livelihoods specialist) and Kennet Korayi (South Sudanese national with significant evaluation
experience). The field mission took place 15-26 February 2010. The programme for the field
mission is shown at Table 1.
Table 1 – Itinerary of the field mission
Tim Lardner
Tues. 16 Feb - Arrival & initial briefings with DDG team

Anna Wood & Kennet Korayi
- Arrival & initial briefings with DDG team

Wed. 17 Feb - DDG operations brief
- Meeting with UNHCR
- Field visit to BAC site (Ganzi)
- Discussions with operational teams Ganzi.
- Overnight in field camp

- DDG operations brief
- Meeting with UNHCR
- Field visit to BAC site (Ganzi)
- Meetings and interviews with Boma
representative, chief and community
members
- Visit to Ganzi vocational skills centre
- Visit MRE field activities, meeting with
MRE team and MRE training participants
- Complete field visit & return to Juba
- Meetings with in Juba with JRS , CRS,
ADRA, GTZ, DED, and DDG Team (Juba)
- Document review & team discussions in
Juba
- Travel to Kit field base

Thurs. 18
Feb
Fri 19 Feb
Sat 20 Feb
Sun 21 Feb
Mon 22 Feb

- Visit Kulipapa BAC site & view operations
- Travel to NPA base camp Yei to view
training course & meet stakeholders
- Meetings with NPA, DDG in Yei
- Return to Juba and team meeting
- Document review & team discussions in
Juba
- Document review, team discussions and
discussions with DDG in Juba
- Meeting with SSDC
- Meeting with UNMAO
- Travel to Mundri

- Field visit to Magwi (town)
- Interviews held with Payam
Administrator, MRE volunteer, Deputy
Head, Head and pupils in Magwi Secondary
School and Primary School,
SSRRC Coordinator and RDS representative
(local radio station and information centre)
- Field representatives from GTZ and DED
were not available
Tues 23 Feb - Field visit to operations site in Mundri
- Field visit to Pageri, Loa & return to Kit
- Return to Juba
- Interviews with local community
representatives including chief and sub
chiefs, MRE volunteer and local residents.
Wed 24 Feb - Team meeting and report preparation
- Return to Juba, follow-up meetings and
report preparation
Thurs 25 Feb - Debriefing & departure (16:45 to Nairobi) - Debriefing & departure (16:45 to Nairobi)
- Meeting with Klaus Ljørring Pedersen,
- Meeting with Klaus Ljørring Pedersen in
Nairobi
Nairobi
Fri 26 Feb
- Nairobi-Oslo
- Nairobi-Geneva

Problems encountered/limitations
As is common in the immediate post-conflict period following extended conflicts, we expected
little accurate baseline data. Data limitations are a constraint to a full understanding and make
it difficult to arrive at rigorous assessments concerning efficiency and effectiveness. In
addition, the original plan was for Vera Bohle, Senior Evaluation Expert at the GICHD, to serve
2|Page
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as evaluation team leader. At the last moment, a medical problem prevented her from
travelling and Tim Lardner was recruited to undertake the mission. Given the short notice, the
team leader was unable to take part in the planning and preparatory phases of the evaluation.
Content of the report
The evaluation report (i) documents achievements, experiences and lessons arising from the
project, (ii) provides the team’s conclusions concerning the evaluation questions,6 and (iii)
provides recommendations regarding possible future project strategies and approaches.

6

The Evaluation Matrix in Appendix 2 details the evaluation questions and sub-questions; the nature of the
question and the relevant criterion; possible performance indicators; likely sources of data; and the data collection
methods.
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2. CONTEXT
Conflict and political development
Sudan has been embroiled in civil wars for much of the period since its independence in 1956.
The latest North/South conflict started in 1983 and resulted in at least 2 million deaths and 4
million people displaced. At the beginning of 2009, UNHCR estimated that 419,000 refugees
were still living in exile and there were 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). 7
This conflict ended formally in January 2005 with the signature of a Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the main rebel group, the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A). The peace agreement created the
Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), which
represented the ten southern regions. The country then entered a six year interim period, due
to end in 2011, when a referendum is scheduled on the self-determination of the south.
Despite the CPA, risks of political or violent conflicts in South Sudan remain high. The
consequences of the planned 2011 referendum remain uncertain, while the CPA has suffered
from a lack of implementation by both parties. The GNU is embroiled in conflicts in Darfur and
East Sudan, while several thousand people died in 2009 due to tribal conflicts in South Sudan,
especially in Jonglei state. The underdevelopment of the region remains a source of tension.
Nature of the contamination
As of June 2009, a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) has been completed in 16 states.8 The UN
Mine Action Office (UNMAO) estimates total contamination of 107 km2. However, systematic
casualty data collection does not exist. The LIS in Central and Western Equatoria identified 93
mine-impacted communities (77 in Central Equatoria). Approximately 1,252,372 residents
were affected, and the communities were the place of origin for almost 295,000 IDP. Over 70%
of the impacted communities reported blocked access to agriculture land and housing. In
addition, 50 communities in Central Equatoria and 19 in Western Equatoria requested UXO
spot clearance in 128 locations. The LIS results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 - LIS results for Sudan

7

2010 UNHCR country operations profile – Sudan, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483b76.html, accessed
26 March 2010
8
In the states where DDG is working (Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria), the LIS was completed in 2006-08.
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In Eastern Equatoria, 43 communities were identified as impacted by landmines, with the
counties of Torit, Magwi and Kapoeta South most affected. Those 43 communities represented
a population of 83,087 people and an estimated 53,000 IDPs. As well, the LIS highlighted the
amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO) littered across Eastern Equatoria, with 93 areas in 48
communities having UXO spot clearance requirements.
International Engagement
In March 2005 – following the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) undertaken by the World Bank
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – the governments of Sudan and
South Sudan, released the Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty
Eradication. This presented the causes of the conflict and under-development, and strategies
for reconstruction and development. Those strategies highlighted the need for: better access
to water and sanitation; developing physical infrastructure; prioritizing agriculture; promoting
private sector development; human rights; and the return of refugees/ IDPs.
Based on the needs identified by the JAM, two multi-sectoral Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs)
were established, one national and the other for South Sudan. The purpose of South Sudan
MDTF was to coordinate donor support for reconstruction and development. However, a midterm evaluation commissioned by NORAD in 2009 showed that: “The World Bank-managed
MDTF was expected to be used as a single aid instrument, allowing for strong donor
coordination and alignment. But by 2007, almost half of the partners’ development assistance
was taking place outside the Fund, either on bilateral programmes (26%) or through other UN
pooled funds (19%)”.9
On 24 March 2005, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established by the
Security Council resolution 1590 (2005). Among other tasks, UNMIS was to: support
implementation of the CPA; facilitate and coordinate, within its areas of deployment, the
voluntary return of refugees/IDPs and the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assist the
parties in the mine action sector; and contribute towards international efforts to protect and
promote human rights.
Sida funding
Sweden and a number of other donors created the Joint Donor Team (JDT – comprising
Sweden, Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom) to encourage
donor coordination, support the MDTFs and manage programmes which cannot be
implemented by the MDTF. But the evaluation of the JDT showed that “Programme
management outside MDTF has remained bilateral, with JDT only having responsibility over
two small funds, the Technical Assistance Fund and the Small Scale Fund”.10
More recently, Sida formulated its strategy for development cooperation in Sudan for 20082011, featuring: peaceful development; respect for human rights; democratic governance; and
lasting reconciliation and national unity within Sudan. During this period, total Swedish
assistance is expected to amount to EUR 95.8 million, excluding humanitarian support.

9

Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan, Executive Summary, 2009, NORAD - Evaluation
Department, http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page?key=125142
accessed 23 March 2010
10
Ibid.
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Sida has provided support to DDG of around 16.5 million SEK in 2008 and 2009. This funding
has been earmarked to the support of operational, personnel and support costs, which often
are split proportionately with other donors. For example, Sida funds 75% of the Programme
Manager’s position, 25% of the Operations Manager’s position, 33% of the (originally three –
now two) Survey/EOD technical advisors and a similar proportion of regionally recruited
positions.
In 2008, Sida funds supported Survey/EOD Teams, MRE Teams, an EOD TA and the Operations
Manager in addition to the Administration/Finance manager and a full range of support
services. The full 2009 budget proposed to, and agreed by, Sida is at Appendix 3 – 2009 SIDA
budget.
Although this report considers the DDG programme as a whole, because of the way that DDG
use donor funds within the programme (i.e. spread among elements although often specific
teams are ostensibly funded by individual donors), the bulk of the report applies to the entire
programme rather than just those components financed by the Sida contribution.11
Future outlook
A number of critical events are scheduled for the next 18 months, which almost ensure that
the period will be turbulent. A national election is scheduled for 11-13 April, and indications
are that the result will be viewed as illegitimate by many in Sudan and internationally.12 A
referendum on self-determination in the South is slated to follow in January 2011. If the South
votes for independence – as is widely expected – then the CPA provides for an interim period
until July 2011, at which time the existing UNMIS mandate will expire. If the referendum is
delayed by the GNU in Khartoum, then the SPLM may opt to declare independence
unilaterally. These are all potential flash points that could ignite the renewal of widespread
violent conflict.
In summary, South Sudan represents a complex and difficult environment. The difficulty in
operating in areas plagued by continuing instability, and where governments lack the capacity
or commitment to exercise leadership in reconciliation and development, are not to be
underestimated. A history of uncertainty, a lack of infrastructure and a population with a low
degree of education all constrain rapid and effective development. In addition, it is only
beginning to become clear to what extent the mine and UXO threat is affecting the population
of Sudan. Finally, the coming year promises to be turbulent and fraught with risks.

11

Throughout 2009, other donors (the Netherlands and DFAIT Canada) have supported the programme with a
mixture of operational, personnel and support costs.
12
See, for but the latest of many analyses, International Crisis Group, Rigged Elections in Darfur and the
Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan, Africa Briefing Nº72, March 2010.
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3. FINDINGS
The Mine Action Programme in Sudan
International Response
Mine action was an important point of entry for the international community’s efforts to
promote peace in Sudan. An Emergency Mine Action Programme was launched in 2002
through an MoU between the United Nations, the GoS and the SPLA. Emergency operations
started in the Nuba Mountains using international and national NGOs for demining and mine
risk education (MRE) to support the Joint Monitoring Commission. In parallel, the UN
supported dialogue between the North and South through a “Cross-Line Support initiative”.
Since then, more than 44 km2 of land have been released and a further 29,000 km of road
verified nationwide.
The UN currently provides technical and financial assistance through the United Nations Mine
Action Office (UNMAO), which was mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and the
CPA to coordinate, facilitate, accredit, and conduct quality assurance of all mine action
activities in Sudan. Following the January 2008 establishment of the UN-African Union Hybrid
operation in Darfur (UNAMID), UNMAO initiated operations in Darfur region.
UNMAO has established Centres in Khartoum in the north and Juba in the south. In the south,
despite the size of affected areas and difficult environment, there have been significant
achievements. At a press conference in January 2010, the director of UNMAS said: “By the
same deadline [June 2011], 849 dangerous areas would have been cleared in addition to the
587 dangerous areas that had been opened up since October 2009, of 1,436 recorded ones.”
UNMAO lists five national priorities:
Opening of primary and secondary routes
Survey, Marking and Clearance
Victim Assistance

Mine Risk Education
Capacity Building

The UNMAO Mine Action Centre in Juba coordinates mine action in the south and additionally
provides support to the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan, UNMIS (which includes a number
of demining units from troop-contributing countries).
In addition, a number of international demining NGOs and firms have initiated operations in
Sudan – primarily in the South. The firms work on commercial contracts issued by UNMAO,
financed by (i) Assessed Budgets for the UNMIS and UNAMID peacekeeping missions, plus the
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action.13 Some INGOs also work on contracts from
UNMAO, but most depend on donor support.
For a number of years, the mine action programme in Sudan has been one of the largest in the
world, with international funding in the range of $70-$80 million per annum.

13

Formally, contracts are issued by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS).
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Government of Sudan Response
Following the 2002 MoU establishing the Emergency Mine Action Programme, the GoS
established a National Mine Action Office in Khartoum while the SPLM established the New
Sudan Mine Action Directorate in Rumbek and Nairobi (later relocated to Juba).14 With the
signing of the CPA, two national mine action centres were established – the National Mine
Action Centre (NMAC) in the North, and the South Sudan Demining Authority/Commission
(SSDA/C) in the South. Later on in December 2005, the Government of National Unity
established the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) through a presidential decree.15 With
support from UNDP, the authorities in the North and the South have also established field
offices in Kassala, Malakal, and Wau, with plans to set up new offices in Kadugli and Ed
Damazin in 2009.
In the South, the SSDA/C is scheduled to take over the mine action coordination role from
UNMAO in June 2011. According to its Strategic Plan for 2009-2011, the SSDC/A vision is: a
society free from threats, effects and impacts of landmines and ERW and its six priorities are:
Coordination and Regulation of Mine Action
Capacity Building
Information, Communication and Education
Landmines Victim/Survivor Assistance
Resource Mobilization, and
Monitoring and Evaluation
SSDA/C has a staff complement in the range of 100 persons.
Future plans
In 2009, the Mine Action Sector16 came together to formulate a Multi-Year Plan (MYP). This
covers the period to 2014, outlining two distinct phases for the mine action programme,
largely due to impending political developments:17
Phase 1: January 2009 – June 2011 (to the end of the existing UNMIS mandate)
Phase 2: July 2011 – April 2014
The MYP states: “The transition will be undertaken in three stages: capacity development;
joint activities; and full national ownership by 2011, dependent on the extension of the UNMIS
mandate. UNMAO will implement an exit strategy while placing key national and international
staff among national authorities’ technical advisors.” Key activities focus around on-the-job
training for staff from the two authorities to support their planning, coordinating and quality
assurance capacities.
The MYP is a useful document, but it is clear that it reflects the consensus among key actors,
who did not use the planning process to press for decisions on controversial issues.18 Further

14

Sudan ratified the Ottawa Convention in October 2003.
The NMAA includes a National Mine Action Committee; a General Secretariat; the NMAC; and the SSDC/A.
16
This comprises international and national NGOs, mine action firms, UN military demining units, and ‘Joint
Integrated Demining Units’ (JIDU – made-up of troops from both the North and South), as well as UNMAO, NMAA,
SSDA/A
17
The current UNMIS mandate is due to expire in January 2011. In addition, the upcoming national elections and
South Sudan referendum ensure a volatile period ahead.
15
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clarity will depend on oversight by a Review Board19 and revisions to the plan. Unless there is
major political upheaval, the transition of responsibility from UNMAO to SSDA/C will occur in
June/July 2011. By that time, UNMAO projects that all the high and medium impacted
communities will be freed from the threats of mines/ERW.
What is absent from this initial edition of the MYP are clear statements of consensus on:
the extent of likely contamination and, hence, the need for mine action services after
the planned transition in mid-2011
the capacity requirements that will be required to meet those needs
GoSS plans for how those capacities should be organised (e.g. public sector; NGO;
commercial) and financed
Without additional clarity on such fundamental issues, it is difficult for DDG and other mine
action operators to plan for the post-transition period.
Textbox 1 – Lessons on the institutional make-up of mine action programmes

IMAS 02.10: Establishment of a Mine Action Programme suggests that a programme should
comprise:
A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) – the policy-making organ: usually, an interministerial committee with members drawn from (i) ministries responsible for the
mine action pillars (e.g. Defence for stockpile destruction; Education for MRE; Health
and Social Welfare for VA; Foreign Affairs for treaty processes), (ii) ministries whose
work programmes are affected by mine/ERW contamination (e.g. Transport; Power;
Agriculture), and (iii) core economic management functions (budget and planning)
A national Mine Action Centre (MAC) – responsible for implementing the policy
including operations planning and coordination, national mine action database,
quality management, etc.
Operators delivering mine action services (demining; MRE; VA)
Since the publication in 1997 of an important UN study on building indigenous capacities for
mine action, the conventional wisdom within the international mine action community is that
the MAC should not have its own capacity for delivery of mine action services; rather,
operators should be independent NGOs, firms or public agencies.
International experience shows, however, that many successful programmes do not adhere to
conventional wisdom. Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Yemen all have effective mine action
programmes and, in each case, the MAC is also the sole or principal demining operator. These
successful programmes all share a common feature: the integrated MAC/operator (ANAMA,
EMAO, and YEMAC respectively) is under a strong board/NMAA. The board makes it clear that
mine action is a priority and that good performance is required. The separation between the
NMAA and the MAC is critical; not the separation between the MAC and the national operator.
What model will South Sudan adopt? Currently, SSDA/C functions as an integrated NMAA and
18

For example, the MYP outlines $37.6 million in MRE projects for 2009-11, indicating the absence of a mechanism
to set priorities within a realistic resource envelope.
19
This is to meet quarterly, co-chaired by the Director Mine Action (UNMAO), Director NMAC and Director SSDA.
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MAC. This has not been a problem to date as UNMAO has the de facto MAC role. After mid2011 however, the current SSDA/C structure could be a problem – we are unaware of an
example of an effective national programme in which there is not a clear separation between
the NMAA and the MAC. The potential for failure would be increased substantially if SSDA/C
also tried to assume the role of the national operator.
International experience suggests one of the following models would be preferred relative to
the existing SSDA/C:
SSDA/C as the NMAA, with a new organisation as a MAC and a separate national
operator
SSDA/C as the NMAA, with a new organisation serving as both the MAC and national
operator
The DDG Mine Action Programme
Strategy
DDG began operations in South Sudan during 2006 with funding via UNHCR. Its efforts were to
facilitate the return of refugees, mainly in the returnee corridors of Central and Eastern
Equatoria. Prior to Sida’s agreement to provide support, DDG received funding from UNHCR,
the Netherlands, Canada, Austria and ECHO. DDG consciously took a community-centred
approach, with priorities defined in a participatory manner, in contrast to most other mine
action operations which are tasked by UNMAO to focus on road verification and other
priorities defined by the UNMIS mission and national authorities based in Juba.
The same year it approached Sida for funding, DDG formulated a Strategic Plan for its
programme in South Sudan (Strategic Planning Document: Year 2008/11). The vision
articulated was “To be the preferred implementing partner in South Sudan for agencies
involved in returnee support and reintegration, and humanitarian development agencies after
the early recovery period.” The programme’s overall objective was “Creating an environment
free of the threat of landmines and ERW, where people can live safely and have access to land
and natural resources.” The Plan outlined six specific objectives:
Table 3 – Specific Objectives from the DDG Strategic Planning Document: 2008-11

1. An expansion of the operational area to
cover 1-2 new states whilst continuing to
consolidate activities within existing areas.
3. Improve HR management to retain
qualified national and expatriate staff, and to
identify national staff for management
capacity building.
5. Strengthen ties to SSDC and potential
national NGO partners through capacity
building and advocacy

2. Investigate the feasibility of involvement
in SALW advocacy and activities.
4. Strengthen policy and programme
development (including DDG’s HIV/AIDS
policy and its Impact Monitoring System)
6. Cooperation with DRC Sudan

The specific objectives of the strategy remain relevant but, over time, the flow of refugees has
shrunk to a situation where, today, there are few refugees and a limited number of IDPs
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returning to their home locations. This focus on returnees no longer reflects the current
situation in South Sudan.
Although the vision in the strategy document has not changed, DDG has recognised the
changing needs of the country and has made changes to maintain relevancy at the operations
level.
Nature of Operations
DDG has sought to establish a unique position within the South Sudan mine action programme
by basing its operations on mobile and flexible Survey/EOD and MRE teams. It delivers the
following services:
Survey and marking – Confirming ERW contamination and marking of dangerous areas (DA),
with the information submitted to UNMAO for entry into the Information Management
System Mine Action (IMSMA) database.
EOD disposal – Immediate Spot Clearance of UXO reported by the community or identified
through community liaison (CL) and survey processes.
Community Liaison – introducing DDG and its work to the community and facilitating the
exchange of information between communities and DDG.
MRE – providing knowledge and information to returnees and communities to mitigate the
threat of mines and ERW and change risk creating attitudes and behaviour.
Coordination – Close cooperation and information sharing with UNMAO and the SSDA/C.
In addition, DDG originally envisaged the following services:
Mine clearance – Few minefields exist in the areas of operations and UNMAO can task other
operators, with more appropriate equipment and structures for such clearance tasks.
Impact monitoring – Baseline and monitoring surveys to assess the impact on the returnees,
communities and humanitarian partner agencies. Baseline surveys have been conducted for
sites where work was conducted in 2009 and 2010. Some follow-up monitoring surveys have
been conducted, but the system is not fully in place.
In its proposal to Sida, DDG specified project objectives in line with its overall programme
objective; basically, a reduction in the threat poses by ERW via (i) better information about the
threat and (ii) removal of ERW. It specified the following expected outputs:
1. General Mine Action assessments to identify community mine action needs and priorities
2. ERW threats as prioritised by the community are removed through EOD operations
3. Risk taking behaviour is changed and immediate threats are mitigated by the delivery of
MRE
4. Coordination between all stakeholders is maintained and enhanced

11 | P a g e

DDG Sida Evaluation: South Sudan

Areas of operations
DDG has been operating in Eastern Equatoria, with Magwi designated as a high priority county,
in large part because high numbers of returnees were expected.
Textbox 2 – Mine/ERW impact in Magwi county

According to the LIS, Magwi is one of the two most impacted counties in Eastern Equatoria,
with two communities classified as high impact, seven medium and one low. Seven people
were victims of landmines and UXO in Magwi in the 24 months prior the 2006 survey,
representing 25% of the total number of victims in Eastern Equatoria. At the time of the LIS,
Magwi County was expecting to receive 30,000 returnees – 60% of all returnees in the
impacted communities in Eastern Equatoria. It is reasonable to conclude that the level of risk
of being involved in a landmine and UXO incident would increase with the number of people
returning. At the time of the LIS, only 30% of the 43 impacted communities reported receiving
Mine Risk Education. (Source – LIS Sudan: Eastern Equatoria. Survey Action Centre/Mines
Advisory Group, 2006)
DDG has moved its site of operations several times in accordance with the tasks assigned, in
line with access to sites during the rainy season and security threats from LRA, especially
around Magwi and Loa. Having a tented field camp means that staff are easily moved
according to changing needs and constraints.
Organisation and staffing
DDG has built an organisation in South Sudan that has been trained to a high standard and is
fully accredited with UNMAO. National staff are evaluated to identify potential managers,
supervisors and local technical advisors, and training is provided on DDG courses in Kenya and
within Sudan. This enhancement of capacities at the individual level aims to reduce the need
for international advisors over time (which will reduce costs) and provide sustainability once
national authorities assume responsibility in 2011.
The organisational structure of DDG as of the end of 2009 is shown at Figure 1. DDG has 76
field personnel (plus a number of temporary personnel serving as guards, cleaners, etc.) split
into two groupings, based in camps at Ganzi and Mundri respectively. The organisation has
built a small but flexible capacity, which appears to be operationally suitable for the
environment.

EOD operations
DDG has two 6-person EOD teams for spot task and two 10-person EOD teams for BAC.
UNMAO appears to be good at utilising the assets of the operators in general and it recognises
DDG capacities that are focussed on EOD spot tasks and EOD/BAC/Cluster weapons clearance.
Recording and reporting mechanisms are very sound. These are still overseen by expatriate
staff in the field (although this is increasingly taken on by national staff) and records are well
organised in Juba. UNMAO and SSDC reporting requirements (the latter somewhat limited) are
fulfilled beyond minimum requirements.
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20

Figure 1 – Organisation chart for DDG operations

At present, UNMAO assigns DDG tasks that are considered priorities based on the data in the
LIS and database.21 DDG also responds to direct requests from the communities for clearance
of spot tasks (and then reports these to UNMAO and SSDA/C). Given the nature of the threat
posed by mines and UXO in Southern Sudan, any intervention targeting these threat can be
seen as relevant to the needs (ensuring a safe environment) of the beneficiaries. Outside this
basic prioritisation, DDG does not yet have its own monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems
fully in place for determining the relevance of interventions. Baseline surveys have been
conducted for all of the 2009 and 2010 work sites, but follow-up monitoring surveys have not
yet been conducted. These have now started and, once in place, this monitoring will help
document the socio-economic benefits stemming from DDG’s EOD operations and allow finetuning of its prioritisation process.
DDG has developed a niche in its capacity for cluster munitions clearance. UNMAO has
embraced this to the extent that it assigns such tasks to DDG whenever possible.
Since the inception of the programme, DDG has destroyed more than 300,000 items of ERW,
about 96% of which is small arms ammunition (SAA). Although this represents potential
20
21

This chart was provided by DDG to the evaluation team during the mission.
UNMAO uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).

13 | P a g e

DDG Sida Evaluation: South Sudan

threats removed, the figures do not necessarily demonstrate how significant the threat
reduction has been.
Table 4 – EOD Clearance Statistics

EOD statistics
EOD Tasks Completed

2006

2007
15

2008

2009

Total

52

212

210

489

0

28

36

NA

74

21

0

66,346

66,441

AP Mines Cleared

0

31

33

45

109

AT Mines Cleared

0

12

9

8

29

UXO Cleared

423

2,378

2,847

4,197

9,845

SAA Cleared

3,354

32,093

195,151

60,955

291,553

Total Items Cleared

3,777

34,594

198,040

65,205

301,616

Tasks On-Going
m2 Cleared

MRE operations
The National Mine Action Strategic Framework for Sudan commits the Sudan Mine Action
Programme to: “Provide Mine Risk Education (MRE) to communities at risk on priority basis.”
UNICEF is the UN focal point for MRE and heads the MRE Working Group (MREWG), which
brings together practitioners to coordinate activities. The MREWG meets approximately every
two months and is attended by the DDG Community Liaison Manager.
DDG has three MRE teams, all of which receive updated information from the community
about UXO threats – an important feedback process – and provide mine risk information to
communities. DDG reports show that, between 2007 and 2009, a total of 602 MRE training
sessions were given, almost 54,000 people were provided with MRE and over 39,000 leaflets
were handed out. In addition, 1,411 community volunteers were trained. It should be noted
that the mechanism for recording such statistics – without recording participant names –
means the results could be misinterpreted.
The evaluation team visited two MRE sessions during the field mission. Each session lasted
approximately 1½ hours and was facilitated by two MRE trainers (mixed sex) and a team
leader, overseen by a supervisor. Each session had around 30 community participants of mixed
ages and with an approximately equal number of male and female participants. The MRE
training focused on an animated presentation with posters, discussion with the participants
and one role play. The training materials were satisfactory but the overall methodology could
be altered to improve the potential effectiveness of the training with the use of standard
methodologies. (See the recommendations at the end of the report.)
The evaluation team saw MRE posters from DDG and other mine action agencies in most of
the local administrative offices, and information such as booklets in the schools. Even though
the impact of this is not being measured, there seems to be a high level of awareness within
the communities of the risk of mines and UXO.
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The evaluation team held focus group discussions with women who attended the training in
Kagwada. While visiting Magwi and Pageri, the evaluation interviewed volunteer MRE trainers,
the Head and Deputy Head teachers of Magwi secondary and primary schools where DDG
provided MRE training, and seven pupils (both girls and boys) who had received MRE.
The effectiveness of the MRE depends somewhat the replication of sessions within the
community. To promote this, as well as sustainability, DDG recruits MRE volunteers in each
community. Volunteers are provided with a photo-book, “Talk before you walk”22 – a portable
version the MRE group training material.
The concept of using volunteers to continue the MRE education is sound in theory, but
appears relatively unstable in practice. There are several areas that might be improved. It is
essential that volunteers fully understand the MRE material themselves, as well as having the
capacity to inform and educate others, but the 5 – 10 minutes extra training they receive
following the community MRE session is insufficient to achieve this.
As well, there currently is no mechanism to assess the competence of the volunteers. The
volunteers interviewed appeared capable and keen but, that said, after a year of volunteering
they had begun to feel less motivated and, effectively, had stopped proactive MRE training.
Two reasons were given: one being difficulty with transport and the other lack of incentive.
DDG does not pay or reward its MRE volunteers. This is a sound principle, but the result is that
the volunteers feel they are not being sufficiently supported.
The IMAS best practice guidebook on MRE monitoring23 states that "To date… MRE projects
and programmes have not been particularly good at identifying, monitoring and reporting
against indicators of impact. More often, programmes have chosen to measure success against
indicators of process or efficiency ….since these are much easier to identify and determine.” The
indicators in the LFA for the DDG MRE programme are precisely these process/efficiency
indicators. The absence of qualitative indicators makes it is difficult to assess the effectiveness
of MRE in achieving the desired outcome – changing risk taking behaviour.
The IMAS guidebook also states that having baseline data on knowledge and attitudes to
mines and ERW is a valuable tool in ensuring that evaluations can be carried out successfully.24
However, there was no evidence that baseline data on current knowledge and practice
regarding mine risk within DDG’s communities has been collected. This, combined with lack of
indicators on MRE quality, means it is impossible to measure the effectiveness of the training.
The evaluation team suggests that the DDG work with its MRE teams to identify suitable
indicators and develop a method for assessing the effectiveness of their activities. One idea
could be to design a short questionnaire on mine risk knowledge and practice and use this to
interview a sample of MRE participants before, immediately following, and again a few months
after the training. This would provide an assessment of retention of the MRE information and
help identify changes in behaviour. It will also be valuable for DDG to know the approximate
coverage (e.g. percentage of community members) of MRE training.

22

This booklet was originally developed by MAG and, subsequently, adopted by DDG.
IMAS Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebook 7 (2005) – Monitoring, Section 4.5 Indicators.
24
IMAS Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebook 1 (2005)
23
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Support to capacity development
Three senior staff members are currently supported on distance learning courses at the
diploma level. These are appropriate to their positions. Five other staff were previously
supported on distance learning courses. Staff are encouraged to obtain technical qualifications
and there are now eight staff members qualified to the EOD level 3 level who have been
trained on courses run internally and externally by DDG. A former EOD level 3 operator has
been promoted to an EOD supervisor. This has removed the requirement for one expatriate
and DDG plans to develop and promote another qualified Sudanese to the supervisor level,
enabling the withdrawal of an additional international by the end of 2010.
The MRE capacity of the programme was fully nationalised more than a year ago and is
operating under the guidance of a well qualified member of staff.25
Support externally has taken several forms:
Training support: DDG and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) established an informal
partnership to implement an EOD level 3 technician course. This was administered by
NPA at its camp in Yei, and DDG provided a chief instructor and some logistical
support. The course successfully trained 16 national staff, from five different
organisations, as EOD technicians.
Support to national NGOs: DDG has provided direct support to, and have an MoU
with, a national NGO – the Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS). As well as
having provided direct training support, DDG has had SIMAS staff seconded to its
operations on a number of occasions for on-the-job training.
Support to national authorities. DDG has provided significant support to SSDC in the
form of places on courses as well as secondments from SSDC to DDG operational
activities. SSDC has welcomed this support.

Linking with other stakeholders
The evaluation team met several INGOs, focussing on those operating in the same areas as
DDG. These meetings provided a basic idea of DDG’s relationships with humanitarian/
development NGOs, but due to time constraints and the availability of INGO representatives at
short notice it was not as full an enquiry as the team would have liked. In general, the NGOs
are aware of DDG’s work, although some thought that DDG undertakes minefield clearance as
well as UXO clearance. Many NGOs said they would like to have more information on MRE,
both for the security of their own field staff and to disseminate along with other educational
material in their awareness raising programmes (HIV/AIDS, nutrition, etc). The NGOs stated
that closer collaboration with mine agencies, including DDG, would help achieve this.

Monitoring of the programme
There have been two formal monitoring missions undertaken by DDG headquarters, in
November 2008 and September 2009. In addition, a programme visit was undertaken by the
(global) DDG Chief Technical Advisor in September 2009 (this did not overlap with the
monitoring mission). The technical visit was focussed on technical matters and did not identify
any major issues. This coincides with the views of the evaluation team.
25

The evaluation team had the impression that this individual has not been pro-active in introducing changes to
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of MRE services, but did not have time to either confirm this or determine
why this was the case – more encouragement/oversight by the Programme Manager might well lead to
improvement.
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4. Conclusions
Relevance
Has the choice of focus areas for the project been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries?
Regarding geographic focus, it is clear from the data available that Central and Eastern
Equatoria are the most heavily impacted states in Southern Sudan.
When DDG began using Sida funds in 2008, the focus was very much on returning refugees,
and DDG based its operations along key corridors and in communities with high numbers of
returnees. Over time, refugee returns have diminished to a trickle and the operational focus
has shifted toward IDP movements and communities with high numbers of returned refugees
and IDPs.
In terms of thematic focus, DDG’s decision to concentrate on EOD and MRE is valid. Although
difficult to quantify, DDG’s role in releasing resources and ensuring safety is appreciated by the
communities. However, the low level of development in south Sudan means that communities
have many needs and priorities. In some cases, there is a reverse flow of returnees from
Eastern Equatoria to neighbouring countries or states due to the lack of basic services in most
parts of the state. The trend is currently low, but it was recognized that these flows could
increase if the situation did not improve in parts of the state.26 Although EOD support will
resolve some of these problems by increasing access to those resources that do exist, South
Sudan still has a long way to go on the road to recovery.
The evaluation team also considers DDG’s ability to carry out spot task clearance on recently
resettled land to be a relevant response to the current and future needs of the beneficiaries in
areas of operation.
As far as general MRE goes, about half the estimated 100,000 refugees returned to Magwi
Country, and the majority of IDPs, are spontaneous returnees27 who receive no support from
the UNHCR or IOM and little or no information about the UXO and mine risk. From
observations along the Kit to Magwi road, some households are also establishing themselves
adjacent to un-cleared but identified minefields. This, together with the fact that UXO are
being discovered regularly by returnees, means that the MRE programmes are playing, and will
continue to play, a role in enabling people to manage the risk posed by mines and UXO.
However, weaknesses in the monitoring system do not allow a clear understanding of how
much benefit MRE actually provides to populations.
To what extent has the support been a coherent and comprehensive response to the needs
of the beneficiaries?
By the time DDG began its operations, a number of other mine action INGOs (MAG, NPA and
FSD) were already well established in South Sudan, in addition to a number of large
commercial contracts issued by UNOPS and UNMAO. DDG’s strategy to use a small, responsive
capacity with CL, MRE and EOD teams gives it a niche and is appropriate given the nature of
the threat in Eastern Equatoria.
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Ensuring the response to the needs of the beneficiaries is coherent and comprehensive is
partly out of DDG’s hands, as UNMAO and the SSDC are responsible for the coordination of
mine action agencies. Within its operational area, DDG addresses the needs of the
beneficiaries in a coherent and comprehensive way by cooperating with the local authorities
and being responsive to the priorities expressed by the communities. A specific example was
the clearance of UXO stockpiles from the secondary school in Magwi, which allowed the Jesuit
Refugee Service (JRS) to renovate and expand this property. The school now serves 400 pupils.
Does the DDG programme strengthen and/or complement other national initiatives, or
hinder them?
While a number of firms and other NGOs provide mine action services in Sudan, the vast area
to be covered, plus the fact that the DDG programme is modest in size and delivers responsive
services, means it has a complementary niche role. In addition, DDG provides useful support to
UNMAO (preferred operator for cluster munitions clearance) and the SSDA/C, including
support to capacity development, which complements other initiatives.
DDG also has provided limited training and capacity development support to SIMAS which has
welcomed DDG’s contribution, although its original support was from FSD. As FSD no longer
has independent operations in South Sudan, DDG complements FSD assistance by, for
example, providing opportunities for on-the-job training.28
What is the value added for DDG/Sida’s involvement in supporting a safe environment for
the returnees in South Sudan?
DDG’s involvement in refugee return was very relevant at the beginning of the project, but in
the dynamic environment in South Sudan, the need for a shift in focus has become clear. The
work now supports communities in which there are significant numbers of returned refugees.
The role that DDG has played within these communities has provided residents with a degree
of additional security, plus greater peace of mind. Members of the communities expressed
their satisfaction that DDG was able to respond (albeit to a modest degree) to their needs and
provides risk reduction in several forms.
Efficiency
Broadly, efficiency can be assessed in terms of the achievement of output targets, which DDG
has done.29
Table 5 - DDG indicators
Indicator (target)
10 general mine action assessments are completed per month
Clearance of ERW on a site by site basis to a minimum of 15 sites per month
being dependent on the level of contamination discovered
ERW contamination is reduced according to community needs and priorities
Danger Areas that are unable to be cleared are marked
All individuals in the communities visited, regardless of sex, have equal access
to the benefits of mine clearance (including employment opportunities and

Achieved

28

In all the cases, changes to the nature of DDG assistance might strengthen/complement other initiatives more
significantly.
29
For details, see DDG, Annual Interim Report to the Swedish International Development Agency covering Mar 2008
to Feb 2009.
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training)
MRE is delivered to 20 communities per month
MRE is delivered to 10,000 beneficiaries dependent on actual numbers of
returnees
All individuals in the communities visited at risk have access to culturally
appropriate forms of MRE that specifically address those activities that put
them at risk
Men and women have equal access to employment opportunities and
benefits deriving from MRE initiatives

(but counting
methodology is weak)

Partly
Partly

Have beneficiaries and key stakeholders been provided with information regarding ERW
contamination as per DDG project proposal?
The length of the MRE training session, at around 1½ hrs, was considered appropriate
considering participants’ other commitments. However, the evaluation team felt that
efficiency could be improved by holding more than one training session per day in
communities that are close to the DDG field camp. To be flexible and to accommodate the
time preference of the participants, MRE teams could hold a several smaller sessions at
different times within the same community. Splitting the training into smaller groups, by
gender and age, would give greater flexibility and would also allow training to be more tailored
to the specific audience. As the names of the participants are not recorded, there currently is
no way of knowing if multiple counting is taking place, so the use of “participants trained” as
an indicator may not be very reliable.30
The use of volunteers to pass on the mine risk message is a great opportunity that could be
exploited further. The volunteers, if adequately trained and monitored, could broaden the
MRE coverage (enhancing efficiency) and provide more effective community liaison. However,
measuring the effectiveness of volunteers in passing on the MRE message (the multiplier
effect) has not yet been carried out in a systematic way and the evaluation team had some
concerns over the current level of effectiveness.
Has an immediate reduction of the threat posed by ERW been achieved as per DDG project
proposal?
DDG’s areas of deployment have been along returnee corridors and, as such, it is likely that
these areas were areas where the highest risk would have existed (hazards on the ground,
together with the presence of relatively high numbers of people). As such, the general
locations of deployments would seem to be correct.
Threat reduction is certainly achieved by the removal of ERW in and around communities, and
DDG teams have removed significant amounts of this. Threat reduction is also promoted
through MRE, if it is effective. While community feedback is positive, the true benefits of MRE
are always difficult to assess and DDG would need to enhance its monitoring system to provide
a reliable basis for drawing a conclusion of the risk reduction achievements of MRE.
Has coordination between all stakeholders been maintained and enhanced as per proposal?
DDG’s project document has three indicators relating to coordination mechanisms:
DDG is represented at monthly SSDC/UNMAO coordination meetings

30

There may well be a requirement for refresher training, but monitoring data should clarify how many people are
participating in their first MRE session, and how many are repeating the training.
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Technical Working Groups relating to Survey, Clearance and MRE are attended by DDG
technical staff
Liaison meetings with local authorities are held in all communities where MRE and
Svy/EOD are active
The achievement of these targets is out of DDG control to a degree. No coordinating meetings
have been held by SSDC/UNMAO since early 2009, nor are there technical working groups for
survey or clearance. DDG does seem to have established strong, but informal, coordination
with the majority of mine action stakeholders. Within the context of a country with formal
structures that do not work effectively, together with logistical difficulties, DDG has been
effective in maintaining and promoting coordination.
Concerning coordination with humanitarian and development actors, DDG could be more
proactive by identifying and proposing specific areas for mutual support and collaboration.
This is especially so with agencies present in DDG areas of operation: ADRA, ARC, GTZ and DED
in Magwi, for example.
Currently, the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) assumes the role
of the registrar of the local organizations at the state level, and aspires to coordinate and
facilitate the activities of community-based organisations (CBO).31 SSRRC organises regular
monthly meetings between UN agencies, INGO and the CBOs. The SSRRC officer in Magwi
stated that he was satisfied with the level of coordination between DDG and the SSRRC office.
Has the operation been implemented in the best/suitable operational set up in order to be
efficient?
The implementation of the project has been well managed overall. Although logistical
constraints are significant in Sudan, access to the operating areas has improved markedly over
the last two years, which has reduced the logistical and administrative burden. The team
believes that more effective operations could result from broader distribution of the
operational teams to allow a wider spread of assets and capacity. This will require more
reliance on local management capacities, but the team believes that DDG is capable of
progress in this direction.
On each MRE team, there currently are two facilitators and one team leader doing the actual
training, and there is one MRE supervisor who monitors, takes notes and provides feedback.
The current methodology used for MRE (posters and discussions) does not require three
trainers to be present.
How has the programme been monitored? Is the programme using lessons learned and
adjusting/ developing where appropriate?
Both monitoring missions from DDG headquarters were thorough and well documented, and
identified a number of issues (relatively minor) to be addressed. One item – the revision of the
Strategic Planning Document to be completed by the end of 2009 – remains unaddressed but
work on this has been rescheduled to mid-2010 based on the planned regional DDG meeting

31

Mapping/Capacity Assessment of Local Organizations involved in Community Driven Development/
Recovery (CDD/CDR) in Southern Sudan. (RIEP) State Annex Report Eastern Equatoria. UNHABITAT/UNDP May 25, 2009
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and the arrival of a new programme manager in February 2010. In the opinion of the
evaluation team, this is a sensible decision.
One area where the programme falls short is in quality management, particularly with respect
to socio-economic outcomes from MRE and EOD operations. This has proved to be a difficult
challenge for mine action in general. DDG has started implementing baseline surveys of all
work sites and has plans for follow-up monitoring surveys, which the evaluation team strongly
endorses. The comparison of ‘before and after’ data will provide DDG with a much firmer
basis for determining the nature and scale of services required, setting task priorities, and
documenting achievements for donors, the GoSS, etc.
Have the strategies and approaches adopted been timely in line with the needs and
priorities of the beneficiaries?
DDG uses participatory approaches, which is a sound strategy for ensuring its services respond
to the needs actually expressed by community members. Community feedback obtained by
the evaluation team was certainly positive, with some concrete examples of how DDG
addressed community priorities. In addition to BAC tasks, DDG has a policy of setting aside at
least one day a week for EOD spot task clearance, and this was praised by many community
members during the evaluation.
Effectiveness
How have returnees and their communities benefited from the project?
Clearly returnees and their communities have benefited by the risk reduction afforded by EOD
survey, marking and clearance. They also enjoy a greater sense of security because of the MRE
provided, although quantifying the actual risk reduction benefit from MRE would require a
more sophisticated (and costly) approach to assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour.
How have humanitarian organisations and their staff benefited from the project?
Humanitarian organisations and their staff have also benefited by the risk reduction afforded
by EOD survey, marking and clearance. Representatives from humanitarian and development
NGOs were aware of DDG activities in a general sense, but not in any detail. These
representatives suggested they would appreciate more support (e.g. MRE training for their
staff) and collaboration, and the evaluation team believes that DDG might do more in this
regard, particularly as the incoming manager has extensive experience working with INGOs in
South Sudan.
What has the project achieved in terms of capacity development?
The project appears to have given greater emphasis to capacity development over time. DDG
has provided good training to its national staff with potential and motivation, and has
promoted those who have been accredited to supervisory levels. As yet, little has been
achieved in developing national staff to the point where they could be promoted to
management positions.
DDG has also supported staff development in both SSDA/C and, more recently, SIMAS. Efforts
to date, however, have been limited to the development of individual capacities.

21 | P a g e

DDG Sida Evaluation: South Sudan

Textbox 3 – Individual, organisational and programme-wide capacities
We can view capacity development in term of four levels:
individual – skills, knowledge and experience
organisational – an organisation’s capability with respect to critical functions (such as human
resource management; financial management; operations management; etc.) and overall
functioning (strategy; governance)
‘network’ – the performance of each organisation in a sector, a province, a programme, etc. is
in large part a function of the actions of the others in the network (sector; province;
programme), so the capacity of the organisations to function in a coherent fashion to achieve
common goals is important
society
DDG has focused to date on support of individual capacities among its own staff and personnel from
SSDA/C and SIMAS. In the future, they might also explore support for capacity development at higher
levels, such as:
organisational – support to a critical functional capability in:
o SSDA/C (e.g. quality management; information management)
o SIMAS (e.g. EOD ‘fire brigade’ response teams; financial management; overall NGO
management)
o incubate a new national NGO from DDG’s existing programme
programme-wide – working with SSDA/C, formulate an implement a strategy for a programmewide approach to (for example):
EOD response teams (‘fire brigades’)
monitoring and evaluation – building on DDG’s impact monitoring system

Have the strategies and approaches adopted been effective and adequate in line with the
needs and priorities of the beneficiaries?
Are the chosen methods and DDG strategy for South Sudan appropriate in the national
context as well as for the objectives set in the programme?
Has the operation been implemented in the best operational manner in order to meet the
needs of the beneficiaries/stakeholders?
The initial response – to establish a programme to support returning refugees – was in-line
with the needs within South Sudan at the time, and implementation appears to have been
effective in providing returnees a safer environment to which to return. More recently, this
aspect of the strategy has become outdated, but the operational approach has been adapted
by the programme managers and, in the view of the evaluation team, remains broadly in line
with needs on-the-ground.
The DDG strategy of community-centred operations that allow participation by community
members is appropriate in the South Sudan context, and is inherently adaptable as needs
evolve. The strategy of using relatively small CL, MRE, and Survey/EOD teams also means DDG
has the flexibility to adjust to evolving priorities.
The opinion of the community members and NGOs interviewed was that there needs to be a
demining agency “on call” to deal with matters as they arise, and this may require DDG to
return periodically to previous areas of operation. The same situation arises with MRE –
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people need refresher training or new returnees need the initial training, and there remains a
role for DDG in this. Keeping the MRE and EOD teams together in one camp is cost effective,
but there may be a case for splitting the camp and the teams to allow the MRE and EOD teams
greater flexibility. Requests for spot task clearance are becoming common and DDG is valued
for its ability to respond in a timely manner. Beneficiary communities seem to have particularly
high expectations regarding support from mine action organisations, which suggests they have
been satisfied with the services provided to date.
Has the programme been successful in mainstreaming cross cutting issues, such as gender? If
not, why?
Gender mainstreaming does not appear to have been successfully promoted by DDG in South
Sudan, and the evaluation team could see no fundamental reason why this is so. The only
element of the DDG programme where there appears to be a gender balance is in the MRE
teams, where there is an equitable ratio of male and female members of staff. In the EOD/BAC
teams, women are not represented.
DDG set itself a target in its strategic plan to add one further EOD team and suggested that
“The additional team will potentially consist of a majority of women and established in mid to
late 2008.” This has not occurred.
In terms of HIV/AIDS issues, the team was unable to find an internal policy (in Sudan) and staff
did not seem to have any awareness of the issue. This is a concern given the amount of time
the DDG teams spend in the field. The evaluation team was told that a policy on HIV/AIDS
existed within headquarters.
Sustainability, exit and transition planning
Is the support provided institutionally and financially sustainable?
Given the dynamic evolution of mine action in South Sudan, the DDG organisational structure
and approach makes sense. However, DDG faces real issues relating to planning over the next
18 months, which are likely to be turbulent. National elections, the referendum on Southern
independence and the handover from UNMAO to SSDC are all scheduled to take place. These
milestones will create threats as well as opportunities, and the evaluation team was
unconvinced that all contingencies have been considered. The strategy review process (which
is intended to address the recognised gaps in the current strategic plan) and the planning
conference scheduled for mid-March will be a good opportunity to address these issues.
While the capacity building element of the programme appears to have gone well, the focus
has all been at middle management level and below. Support to SSDA/C has also focused on
mid-level personnel. This work is commendable – and reflects the fact that personnel must
develop their technical and supervisory skills before they would be suitable candidates for
management positions – but it leaves the DDG programme exposed in terms of sustainability.
Various options exist: integration into another NGO; integration into a governmental agency;
formation of a national NGO, etc. – but there appears to have been only limited consideration
of these options to date. Now is the time when these issues need to be addressed, before the
political and, possibly, operational maelstrom of the next 18 months. As well, the low levels of
education that prevails in South Sudan means that it will take time to assist even highly
motivated individuals to assume management responsibilities, so it is best to start the process
as soon as is feasible.
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From a financial perspective, the level of expatriate staffing in the programme places a
significant burden on the donors. Without this overhead, there are more options that could be
considered.
A closely related issue is whether to initiate support for broader organisational development in
SSDA/C and, perhaps, a local NGO such as SIMAS. Undoubtedly, the absence of a national mine
action strategy that clearly outlines a plan for after mid-2011 makes it risky for DDG (and the
other mine action INGOs) to make their ‘strategic bets’ for transition: should they focus on
SSDC and government operators, or does the GoSS envisage a continuing role for local NGOs
or firms?
Is DDG prepared for future risks from political or armed conflict?
The risks extant in South Sudan at the moment are potentially significant. At a political level,
the changes ongoing – elections and the referendum in particular – raise the not insignificant
possibility of unrest over the next couple of years. In addition, at a lower level, tribal fighting,
particularly in Jonglei, could spill over into other regions.
From an operational perspective, DDG has detailed plans to take into account the possibilities
of political and armed conflict. The organisation takes an essentially low-key, “soft” approach
to risk management, but has good links with the local communities in which it operates. There
has been one incident where DDG was required to relocate quickly due to the impending
arrival of an LRA element; this appears to have been undertaken effectively and without loss.
DDG is part of the “Comprehensive Juba plan,” which is co-ordinated by the NGO community
and supports the evacuation of international staff should the need arise.
Does DDG have realistic plans in place for exit and transition?
On several issues such as exit/transition, DDG seems to be deferring decisions while awaiting
the results of the political processes over the next 18 months. Current plans suggest waiting
until the UNMAO-to-SSDA/C transition has taken place. The evaluation team does not believe
this is an appropriate posture. We recommend a planning process should begin now to
formulate options based on several conceivable scenarios over the next 18 months (i.e.
contingency planning). We understand this issue was on the agenda for the DDG regional
meetings, scheduled for 22-26 March in Nairobi.
Coverage
Which beneficiaries and groups have been included/ excluded from the project?
There is no apparent exclusion on basis of ethnicity. In Magwi, DDG operates in both the Acholi
and Madi corridors. In Kit, where at least two ethnic groups reside, DDG operates in both
areas. DDG also recruits MRE volunteers from both communities.
As well, there does not appear to be any exclusion in terms of gender: the evaluation team
met both male and female MRE volunteers. MRE teams are representative of both sexes, and
the ratio of participants appears to be approximately even. However, there may be issues
related to timing for MRE training. Sessions are held for mixed groups. The timing for these
training sessions may not be appropriate to women and this should be assessed.
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The only group that reported exclusion was the disabled. In a meeting at Kagwada, a blind
participant complained that DDG did not include him and other disabled members of the
community.32
Coordination
Is DDG able to coordinate effectively in light of donor, liaison partner, and CSO actions?
DDG is well regarded in the mine action community in South Sudan. In terms of key
stakeholders, its relationships with both SSDA/C and UNMAO are strong.
The team felt that DDG’s relationships with donors, national authorities and the UN appeared
well established and constructive. However, the team felt that DDG have been tightly focussed
on delivering mine action services, and could improve its relationship and communications
with CBO and non-mine action NGOs.

32

The evaluation team did not observe MRE sessions targeted for children during the mission, nor see training
materials appropriate for children. DDG has since confirmed that it does have MRE materials for children, and does
deliver sessions aimed at children.
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5. Recommendations
Recommendations for DDG
DDG should:
1. Revise its strategic plan to incorporate:
a focus on community security and development needs rather than the safe return of
refugees
contingency plans or strategic options regarding transition/exit, each based on a
potential scenario and depending on the outcomes of, at least:
o the national election
o the referendum on self-determination for South Sudan
o the ending or prolongation of the UNMAO mandate in the South
a more ambitious plan to support the development of national capacities, going
beyond individual capacities to include functional capabilities of partner organisations
(e.g. quality management; financial management) or the national programme (e.g.
national monitoring and evaluation systems) – see Textbox 3 – Individual,
organisational and programme-wide capacities
options for enhancing its cost-effectiveness, which could entail
o reducing the number of expatriate staff, or
o achieving scale economies by broadening the geographic area of operations or
scope economies by adding new services, such as SALW management for
community security
2. Fully implement its plans for monitoring and reporting on the developmental outcomes
stemming, in whole or in part, from its services (i.e. baseline and post-completion
monitoring surveys).
3. Strengthen its coordination with development agencies.
4. Address cross-cutting issues more thoroughly; in particular, gender & diversity, plus
HIV/AIDS.
6. Strengthen its MRE services by:
dividing participants into smaller groups based on age and gender, and building more
role play into the training, particularly for groups with lower literacy
developing the MRE volunteer resource more effectively by thorough vetting of
potential volunteers, a comprehensive training process, and regular monitoring and
evaluation of volunteer activities
expanding the number of MRE sessions held in a day and the number of communities
covered over a period of time
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Recommendations for Sida
Sida should:
3. Maintain funding to DDG, assuming its project proposal adequately addresses the
recommendations listed above, including the incorporation of a transition and exit
strategy, at least with respect to the delivery of the existing range of MRE and EOD
services.
4. Work with other mine action donors to encourage UNMAO and SSDC to update the MultiYear Plan for the Mine Action Programme, which should incorporate clear statements on:
the projected extent and impact of the contamination that will remain as of mid-2011
(i.e. the needs assessment)
the capacities that will be required to address the threat remaining after mid-2011,
and
the GoSS vision and strategy for how those capacities will be financed and delivered,
including the capacities required for:
o making policy and strategy
o operational planning and coordination
o delivery of mine action services
Textbox 1 – Lessons on the institutional make-up of mine action programmes has some
additional information on why clarity on the GoSS vision and strategy for the organisational
make-up of the national mine action programme is important to clarify in advance of the
transfer of responsibility from UNMAO to SSDA/C.
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Appendix 1 – Terms of Reference
1.

Background

In 2008, UNHCR estimated that approx 260.000 refugees were still living in exile and the number
of registered IDPs were just below 487.000 (IOM, 2008). The exact number of spontaneous returns
and resettlements is not known, but it is likely to add to the total number of displaced people South
Sudan33. On 1 March 2008 Danish Demining Group (DDG) entered into a two-year agreement with
the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) to implement the project “Survey, Explosive
Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and Mine Risk Education in Southern Sudan”.
Other donors during 2009 have been the Government of Netherlands (NG) and the UNDP/DFAIT
Canada (GPSF) which have supported the programme, each with a mixture of operational,
personnel and support costs. The periods and operational resources funded by each donor have
been:
Donor/capacity
Sida

Netherlands

UNDP/GPSF

teams
EOD team 1,2, 3
MRE team 1
CL teams 1,2
EOD team 4
MRE teams 2,3
EOD teams 1,2,3
MRE teams 2,3

Remarks
Project duration:
1 Mar 200828 Feb 2010
Project duration:
1 Jan 200831 Dec 2011
Project duration:
15 May-14 Jul 2009
This short project duration allowed DDG to
save expenses temporary on the other
2 budgets.
* In addition to this DDG entered into a
direct partnership with GPSF the latter
3 months of 2009

The focus of the project is to support the repatriation process for refugees and IDPs in South
Sudan. The intervention should provide a safe environment for the returnees and communities and
facilitate the work of humanitarian organisations through EOD clearance and mitigating the threat
posed by ERW (Explosive Remnants of War). Landmines and ERW pose a threat and level of
uncertainty to returnees, existing local communities and the humanitarian organisations that are
endeavouring to assist them in a return to a normal and safe existence. All three donors in 2009
have been part of supporting this overall project focus.
The project objectives are:
Overall objective: To provide a safe environment for the returnees and the communities, and
facilitate the work of humanitarian organisations.
Specific objective: Provide beneficiaries and key stakeholders with improved information
regarding ERW contamination and an immediate reduction of the threat posed by ERW to
provide a safe environment for communities.

33

Annex A refers for further general context information
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The Sida financed project period is ending in 2010 and Sida and DDG have discussed the
possibility of a continuation of the project. It is in the interest of both parties to carry out the
evaluation in order to acquire recommendations to inform this decision. Furthermore, both parties
wish to evaluate the outcome and relevance of the project.
To allow sufficient time for analysis of the evaluation findings Sida will consider providing a four
month extension of the project, until 30 June 2010.
2.
Purpose of the evaluation
The purpose of the evaluation is two-fold: 1) inform Sida’s and DDG’s decisions regarding a
continuation of the project; 2) contribute to improving the programme through documenting lessons
learned and providing recommendations
The primary intended users of the evaluation will be Sida’s programme officers and strategic
managers at Sida’s Sudan Team, Sida’s Human Security Policy Department and DDG’s
Programme Coordinator, the Programme Manager and the Danish Refugee Council Policy Unit.
3.
Evaluation objective
The objective of the evaluation is to ascertain results (output and outcome) and assess the
efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the project “Survey, Explosive Ordinance Disposal and
Mine Risk Education, in Southern Sudan” with a specific focus on the Sida contribution.
Specifically, the objective of the evaluation is to (i) summarise achievements, experiences and
lessons on what might have affected the implementation of the project; and (ii) provide
recommendations regarding possible future project strategies and approaches.
4.

Key issues/questions to address in the evaluation

Relevance
The relevance of the project objectives and the logic behind them given the situation and needs of
the beneficiaries.
Has the choice of focus areas for the project been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries?
To what extent has the support been a coherent and comprehensive response to the needs of
the beneficiaries?
Does the DDG programme strengthen and/or complement other national initiatives, or hinder
them?
What is the value added for DDG / Sida’s involvement in supporting a safe environment for the
returnees in South Sudan?34
Efficiency
The efficiency with which the project is translated into activities including financial and human
resources, management, and monitoring and evaluation.

34

For this exercise it is recommended to use the LFA produced in conjunction of the proposal from 2008. Outputs, outcomes and
indicators can be used as benchmarks. DDG’s own Impact Monitoring system can naturally be used in connection with this – but no
impact assessment have yet been implemented. Must be discussed with Sida and the consultant what is most appropriate.
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Have the strategies and approaches adopted been effective, timely and adequate in line with
the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries?
Has the operation been implemented in the best / suitable operational set up in order to be
efficient?
How has the programme been monitored? Is the programme using lessons learned and
adjusting / developing where appropriate?
Effectiveness
The effectiveness of the project in achieving the objectives set out, including choice of strategies
and approaches.
To what extent has the project achieved the objectives set out?
Are the chosen methods and DDG strategy for South Sudan appropriate in the national
context as well as for the objectives set in the programme?
Has the operation been implemented in the best operational manner in order to meet the
needs of the beneficiaries / stakeholders?
Has the programme been successful in mainstreaming cross cutting issues, such as gender?
If not, why?
Other issues to be examined include:
The sustainability of the support provided to the project. Is the support provided institutionally and
financially sustainable?
Coverage – which beneficiaries and groups have been included/excluded from the project?
Coordination – the project cannot be evaluated in isolation from what others are doing, including
donors, liaison partners and CSOs.
5.

Evaluation methodology
a.
Phase one: inception phase, desk review, discussions and interviews with Sida HQ
and DDG HQ. Develop inception report.
b.
Phase two: Field visit to project sites in Southern Sudan
c.
Phase three: Evaluation report writing, dissemination and presentation of results

6.

Expected outputs:
a.
An evaluation inception report prepared and approved by Sida before commencing
phase two. The inception report should state clearly who the intended users of the
evaluation are, and how these will be involved in the evaluation process. It should
also include a detailed description of the methodology and research strategy and
analytical approach specifying how the analysis will be performed. A list of questions,
description of sources of evidence, and data collection process and methods to be
used should also be described in the inception report. A detailed work plan should be
included in the inception report with key activities and plans for field work. For further
guidance see Annex A.
b.
A debriefing workshop of preliminary findings and conclusions provided to DDG and
Sida in Sudan at the end of field visit.
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c.

d.

e.
7.

A written evaluation report of no more than 30 pages (excluding annexes) in line with
to Sida’s reporting format35 submitted by 1 April 2010. The evaluation report should
adhere to the DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.
The recommendations in the report will aim to guide DDG in assessing future
objectives, help in improving the design and implementation of the programme The
recommendations to Sida should cover the whole spectrum of aid management,
including resource allocation, financing, planning, implementation, and monitoring
and evaluation.
Presentation of findings and recommendations to Sida and DDG in April/May

Responsibility and management of the evaluationa.
DDG Programme Coordinator, DDG HQ along with Programme Coordinator Sida,
Stockholm
b.
The evaluation will be carried out by an independent and impartial consultant.
c.
The final approval of reports and any significant changes to the evaluation will be
done by Sida

8.
Team and qualifications
The consultant must not have been involved in the DDG Southern Sudan programme in any way. If
there may be issues with regard to impartiality and conflict of interest, the consultant should clearly
state so in the proposal submitted.
The consultant should have the following qualifications:
i.
Broad and strong technical MA knowledge
ii.
Analytical skills
iii.
Strong experience in measure / value MA against socio-economic and
broader context issues
iv.
Cultural and political sensitive
v.
Experience in reviews and evaluations, including interview skills
vi.
Excellent in English
vii.
Strong writing, communication and facilitation skills

The consultants should prepare a proposal (incl. CV) indicating what approach and methodology
they intend to use for the assignment, together with a work plan of activities, as well as budget,
including proposed daily fee rate and reimbursable expenses (e.g. travel etc.).
9.
Timing
Starting mid-January 2010. Desk review can be conducted earlier if required. Field work suggested
implemented in weeks 5 and 6, 2010.
10. Budget
Pending consultant fee and anticipated cost.

35

See for guidance Sida’s Evaluation Manual (http://www.sida.se/PageFiles/3736/SIDA3753en_Looking_back.pdf).

iv | P a g e

DDG Sida Evaluation: South Sudan

Appendix 2 – Evaluation Matrix: DDG South Sudan
Question/Issue (question type)

Possible indicators (otherwise
Sources of data (preliminary)
Data collection methods
comments)
The relevance of the project objectives and the logic behind them given the situation and needs of the beneficiaries
Has the choice of focus areas for
UNHCR reports
Area priorities identified by
Document review
the project been relevant to the
UNHCR
LIS
Semi-structured interviews
needs of the beneficiaries?
Community impact scores
Govt., NGOs etc.
with representatives in
(Descriptive)
South Sudan
Requests from govt., NGOs etc.
Beneficiary views
To what extent has the support
DDG needs assessment
Document review
Comment: Three levels of ‘needs’ to
been a coherent and
reports
assess: (i) needs vis-à-vis explosive
Semi-structured interviews
comprehensive response to the
Needs assessments from
hazards;
(ii)
needs
vis-à-vis
productive
with representatives in
needs of the beneficiaries?
UNHCR, other UN agencies
use
of
unblocked
assets;
(iii)
South Sudan
(Descriptive)
and NGOs in South Sudan
sustainable livelihoods needs more
Participatory community
LIS
generally
visits
Beneficiary views
Does the DDG programme
Overlaps (by area + service
strengthen and/or complement
provided)
other national initiatives, or
Numbers of humanitarian/
Document review
Mine action actors (SSDC,
hinder them? (Descriptive)
development agencies working in
UNMAO, NPA, MAG, national
Semi-structured interviews
DDG areas
NGOs)
with mine action actors
What is the value added for
Areas covered/services provided
Other actors (GoSS, UNHCR,
Semi-structured interviews
DDG/Sida’s involvement in
by other mine action actors
Joint Donor Team, UNDP)
with other actors
supporting a safe environment for
Areas covered/services provided
the returnees in South Sudan?
by humanitarian + development
(Descriptive)
actors
The efficiency with which the project is translated into activities including financial and human resources, management, and monitoring and
evaluation
Have beneficiaries and key
DDG progress reports and
general mine action assessments
stakeholders been provided with
monitoring mission reports
completed (10/month)
Document review
information regarding ERW
DDG staff
MRE delivered (20 communities/
Interviews (see column
contamination as per DDG project
month)
Beneficiary communities
sources of data for details)
proposal? (Normative)
No. of beneficiaries of MRE
SSDC/UNMAO
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Question/Issue (question type)

Has an immediate reduction of
the threat posed by ERW been
achieved as per DDG project
proposal? (Normative)

Has coordination between all
stakeholders been maintained
and enhanced as per proposal?
(Normative)

Possible indicators (otherwise
comments)
(10,000 dependent on numbers of
returnees)
Delivery or culturally appropriate +
targeted MRE.
Equal access to employment
opportunities deriving from MRE
initiatives
Clearance of ERW on a site by site
basis to a minimum of 15 sites per
month have been conducted
(number depending on the level of
contamination discovered)
ERW contamination is reduced
according to the community needs
and priorities
Danger areas that are unable to be
cleared are marked
All individuals in the communities
have been visited, regardless of
sex, and have equal access to the
benefits of mine clearance
(including employment
opportunities and training)
DDG is represented at monthly
SSDC/UNMAO coordination
meetings
Technical Working Groups relating
to Survey, Clearance and MRE are
attended by DDG technical staff
Liaison meetings with local
authorities are held in all
communities where MRE and

Sources of data (preliminary)

Data collection methods

DDG progress reports and
monitoring mission reports
DDG staff
Beneficiary communities
SSDC/UNMAO

Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)

DDG progress reports and
monitoring mission reports
DDG staff
Beneficiary communities
SSDC/UNMAO

Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)
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Question/Issue (question type)

Has the operation been
implemented in the best/suitable
operational set up in order to be
efficient? (Descriptive)

Possible indicators (otherwise
comments)
Survey/MRE are active
Operational structures of other
operators
Unit costs (e.g. per deminer; per
community) of other operators

Sources of data (preliminary)

DDG, other MA NGOs,
SSDC/UNMAO

Data collection methods
Document review
Review of findings from
previous evaluations of
other MA operators in
South Sudan

How has the programme been
Frequency of monitoring visits
DDG monitoring & impact
monitored? Is the programme
Document review
Frequency & quality of analytic
monitoring reports
using lessons learned and
reports based on impact data
Interviews (see column
DDG Sudan management
adjusting/ developing where
sources of data for details)
Specific examples of adjustments
team
appropriate? (Descriptive)
introduced
Have the strategies and
DDG strategies, needs
approaches adopted been timely
Document review
Needs assessment
assessment & monitoring
in line with the needs and
Interviews (see column
reports
Frequency of monitoring visits
priorities of the beneficiaries?
sources of data for details)
Beneficiary communities
(Descriptive)
The effectiveness of the project in achieving the objectives set out,36 including choice of strategies and approaches.
How have returnees and their
Community EOD surveys
communities benefited from the
conducted
project? (Descriptive)
Devices located + destroyed
Areas marked
Document review
DDG progress reports and
Beneficiaries of MRE sessions
Participatory community
monitoring mission reports
visits
Reports of devices by beneficiaries
SSDC/UNMAO statistics
to DDG or authorities
Interviews (see column
Beneficiary communities
sources of data for details)
Community populations (former
UNHCR
refugees; former IDP; total)
Observation
Lower ERW accident rate
Women, men, girls, boys know and
avoid dangerous areas

36

The overall objective set-out in the Evaluation ToR differs from that in the original DDG proposal. We have used the version set-out in the ToR.
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Question/Issue (question type)
How have humanitarian
organisations and their staff
benefited from the project?
(Descriptive)
What has the project achieved in
terms of capacity development?
(Descriptive)
Have the strategies and
approaches adopted been
effective and adequate in line
with the needs and priorities of
the beneficiaries? (Descriptive)
Are the chosen methods and DDG
strategy for South Sudan
appropriate in the national
context as well as for the
objectives set in the programme?
(Descriptive)

Has the operation been
implemented in the best
operational manner in order to
meet the needs of the
beneficiaries/ stakeholders?
(Descriptive)

Possible indicators (otherwise
comments)
Survey/risk education tasks
conducted at request of
humanitarian organisations
DDG staff trained
SIMAS staff trained
Level of training
SSDC staff trained
Needs assessment
Frequency of monitoring visits

Other MA NGOs use similar
approaches and consider them
successful
Project objectives have been
achieved
SSDC/UNMAO consider the
approaches successful
Beneficiary satisfaction
Other MA NGOs use similar
approaches and consider them
successful
Project objectives have been
achieved
SSDC/UNMAO consider the
approaches successful
Beneficiary satisfaction

Sources of data (preliminary)
DDG progress reports and
monitoring mission reports
SSDC/UNMAO statistics
Humanitarian organisations
operating in the project area
DDG
SIMAS
SSDC
UNMAO
DDG strategies, needs
assessment & monitoring
reports
Beneficiary communities

DDG strategy
SSDC/UNMAO
Other MA NGOs
Beneficiaries

DDG
SSDC/UNMAO
Other MA NGOs
Beneficiaries

Data collection methods
Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)
Observation
Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)
Observation
Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)
Observation

Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)
Observation

Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)
Observation
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Question/Issue (question type)
Has the programme been
successful in mainstreaming cross
cutting issues, such as gender? If
not, why? (Descriptive)

Possible indicators (otherwise
comments)
Male/female ratio in staffing
Male/female ratio in supervisory
positions
Male/female ratio of trainees

Sources of data (preliminary)
DDG
Other MA NGOs
Other humanitarian NGOs
SSDC/UNMAO

Coverage – which beneficiaries and groups have been included/excluded from the project?
Which beneficiaries and groups
Ratio of impacted communities
have been included/ excluded
supported by DDG
DDG
from the project? (Descriptive)
Ratio of ethnic/livelihood groups
LIS
assisted by DDG
Communities
Ratio of women surveyed/included
in community meetings
Coordination (including donors, liaison partners and CSOs
Is DDG able to coordinate
DDG
DDG contingency plans
effectively in light of donor,
SIDA
Meetings conducted
liaison partner, and CSO actions?
MA NGOs in South Sudan
Agreements achieved on critical
(Descriptive)
Development NGOs in South
issues
Sudan
Other issues: (i) sustainability and (ii) exit and transition planning
Is the support provided
institutionally and financially
SSDC/UNMAO plans
sustainable? (Descriptive)
Donor plans

DDG
Other MA NGOs
SSDC/UNMAO
Sida
Other donors to DDG South
Sudan

Data collection methods
Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)
Observations

Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)
Community visits

Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)

Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)
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Question/Issue (question type)
Is DDG prepared for future risks
from political or armed conflict?
(Descriptive)

Does DDG have realistic plans in
place for exit and transition?

Possible indicators (otherwise
comments)
DDG has access to up-to-date
security information for South
Sudan
Contingency plans exist, including
different possible scenarios
Suitable evacuation plans exist for
international staff
Status of exit/transition planning
Evidence of discussions with SSDC,
SIMAS & other potential partners

Sources of data (preliminary)
DDG
UN security
Policy Research Institutes
analysing Sudan and South
Sudan
Other NGOs
DDG
SSDC & SIMAS
International Mine Action
NGOs

Data collection methods

Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)

Document review
Interviews (see column
sources of data for details)
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Appendix 3 – Interviewees
Name
Chris Bath
Philip Sullivan
Geoff Wordley
Max Wenbo
Magnus Carlquist
Jurkuc Barach Jurkuc
Mark Connelly
Justin Green
“Baz” Jolly
Caesar
Wani
John Sørbo
Max Wenbo
Charles Wani

Klaus Ljørring Pedersen
Beate Mueller-Grunewald
Manfred van Eckert
Atsu Andre Agbogan
Jack Bilal
Awadia Ogillo
?
Okumu Joseph
Gertrude Kiai
Akileo Ribe Manase
Johnson Okello
Jessica Achiro
Oyet Moses

Pupils: 2 female, 1 male
Pupils: 2 female, 2 male
Beranadino Yambayamba
Sabasaba Justin Odego

Organization
DDG
DDG
UNHCR
DDG
SIDA
SSDC
UNMAO
DDG
DDG
DDG
DDG
NPA
DDG
DDG
DDG
DDG
DED
GTZ
JRS
ADRA
ADRA
ADRA
ADRA
Ganji Vocational skills
training centre
Kulipapa Boma
Magwi – Payam
Kit Boma
Magwi Payam
Magwi Secondary School
Magwi Primary School
Magwi Secondary school
Magwi Primary School
Pageri Payam
Payam Administrator

Title
Country Programme Manager, DDG
Operations Manager, DDG
Assistant Representative (Operations)
Course Manager EOD course DDG/NPA
Director
QA Officer
Technical Advisor
Technical Advisor

Technical Advisor to SSDC
Chief Instructor EOD 3 course
MRE team
Desk Officer Horn of Africa & Armed Violence
Reduction
Regional Coordinator
Country Director
Country Director
Magwi Programme Manager
Associate Country Director
Agriculture Coordinator
Pageri

Sub-chief
Administrator
MRE volunteer – Kit
MRE volunteer –Magwi
Deputy Head Teacher
Head Teacher

Chief, Loa
Pageri Payam
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Appendix 3 – 2009 SIDA budget
Personnel
Expatriate
International Staff salary
Insurance international staff
International travel
R&R
Uniforms international staff
Training international staff
Water etc international staff
Total Expatriate

Budget 2009
2,041,716.21
96,645.41
155,815.58
322,156.45
21,738.51
16,269.49
48,684.63
2,703,026.27

National Staff
Local Staff salary
Insurance local staff
Food allowance local staff
Travel local staff
Training local staff
Total National Staff
Total Personnel

1,507,214.21
237,221.03
335,034.45
22,610.80
90,352.40
2,192,432.88
4,895,459.16

Operations
Vehicle and Generator
Rent vehicle and generator
Insurance vehicle and generator
Fuel
Maintenance
Total Vehicle and Generator

0.00
186,382.94
1,185,040.42
1,307,678.63
2,679,101.99

Operations
Communications
Survey/EOD material
Explosives
EOD material
Marking material
Safety material
First aid and medical material
Uniforms
Camp materials and others
MRE materials
IT
Stationary
Freight
Other materials
Compound
Utilities
Security
Bank charges 1%
Miscellaneous
Total Operations other
Total Operations

270,355.51
14,859.23
148,592.34
29,718.47
7,429.62
9,906.16
17,335.77
85,646.97
33,680.93
12,382.70
19,812.31
40,119.93
37,148.09
74,296.17
361,574.69
36,322.57
49,530.78
46,443.69
24,765.39
1,319,921.32
3,999,023.32

Equipment
Vehicles
Communications equipment

74,296.17
10,624.35
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Computer equipment
EOD equipment
Office equipment
Protective equipment
Medical equipment
MRE equipment
Camp equipment
Total Equipment

42,101.16
20,208.56
23,114.36
0.00
0.00
0.00
66,041.04
236,385.65

Other
Monitoring and Evaluation
Regional representation
Workshop, seminars, international
PR, marketing and visibility
Auditing and legal advice
Capacity building of local partner
Total Other

82,551.30
12,382.70
49,530.78
10,318.91
8,255.13
41,275.65
204,314.47

Administration
Liability Insurance @ 1%
Home administration
HQ Salary and Joint expenses 5%
HQ Reserve: 1,5% af adm. bidrag
Total Home administration
TOTAL COSTS

93,351.83

464,355.32
7,071.40
471,426.72
9,899,961.13
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